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Abstract

The paper presents a synthesis theoretical framework that could serve as a basis for empirical studies of the fulfillment of electoral pledges in modern democracies. Studies related to the program-to-policy linkage for the most part derived their hypotheses from an implicit, common sense model associated with mandate theory. In order to expose its background assumptions a realistic version of such a positive mandate theory is put forth that draws on the concept of the partially restricted mandate, as well as manifesto-based governance and responsible party government. Amongst the major buildings blocks of this framework counts campaign informativeness; the transparency of electoral pledges; and the unambiguity of the results of the authorization process, i.e. the election. The result of our theoretical survey is a conceptual account which provides fertile ground for the generation of testable hypotheses for empirical pledge research.

In modern democracies politicians are called on the carpet over their broken promises on a regular basis. The pledge 'read my lips: no new taxes' cost George H. W. Bush the 1992 US presidential elections. The trustworthiness of the sitting president was called into question, even as he had made a seemingly honest attempt at reconciling with the Democrats in order to bring down the budget deficit.

So why does the public sanction—let us assume this—honest politicians set out to implement the 'public good'? The answer lies in the nature of the role elections play in modern representative democracies. Elections provide a mandate, which here is defined as a partially bound authorization. Any violation of this mandate may potentially backfire, but the damage done is a function of a number of external factors including PR, credible motives etc.

The precise role of the mandate in the mechanism of representative democracy is further blurred by theoretical debates about the 'carrier' of this mandate, the election. According to normative conceptions of representative democracy, it is elections that provide an opportunity to express the popular will and to exercise control over representatives. It has been contested for long whether elections are primarily about determining the government policy in line with the popular will, the selection of the representatives, or about stripping poorly performing governments from power.

In this article, elections are assumed to be as acts of mandate-generation, and mandates are proxied by electoral pledges. Linking these elements is a 'realistic version of positive mandate theory', which is best understood as a conceptualization of the empirical mandate—or: the collection of policy pledges made by a party—and its implementation (the fulfillment of pledges).

We explore the relevance of this descriptive model in three steps. The next section outlines the logical structure of a realistic version of positive mandate theory. We go on to explore five principal sources of our conceptual synthesis in the history of the discipline. The final section summarises the theoretical results of the paper, and refines the framework in light of the literature.

A Realistic Version of Positive Mandate Theory

The passage between the empirical study of the enactment of election pledges and the theoretical literature on representative government is far from smooth. Thus it is not very surprising that one rarely finds works which not only develop the theoretical foundations of research, but which also treat these foundations in a framework also addressing the practical problems of research design and choice of methodology, such as the difficulties of coding pledges or operationalizing pledge enactment.

A daunting, but not quite impossible task – and it is exactly the aim of the theoretical framework that can most accurately be described as <u>a realistic version of positive mandate theory</u>. Its most important building blocks are (1) the theory of the bound and free mandate, (2) the party theory of representation, (3) the doctrine of responsible party government, (4) modern mandate theory (à la Manin et al. 1999a, 1999b) and (5) the separation of delegation and mandate in the typology of political representation (Andeweg and Thomassen 2005), along with some additions and further elaboration thereof. Each item will be analyzed in more detail, but let us take a preliminary look in a schematic form how they relate to the core idea of the synthesis framework!

Why positive?

One of the two main attributes of the framework proposed in this paper, is the positive-realistic nature of the theory. This begs the question of how it relates to its siblings, mandate theories with normative inclinations. The simple answer, to be discussed below, is that normative assumptions cause inconsistencies between the building blocks and are, therefore, dropped from the synthesis account. To illuminate this, we need to refer to some key features of modern normative mandate theory.

In the footsteps of the classical normative approach, the most salient feature is that representative governance also entails governance in the public interest (Pitkin 1967; Przeworski et al. 1999b). This occurs when the following descriptive (1-3) and normative (4-5) assumptions are met (Manin et al. 1999b: 30-33):

(1) Election campaigns provide relevant information about the policies to be pursued ('informativeness');

(2) The voters rightly expect that the government policy will be identical to the election pledges – politicians will adhere to and fulfill their promises;

(3) The voters are steadfast, i.e. that they will adhere to their preferences (expressed through the elections) throughout the whole cycle;

(4) Pursuing the successful election program, i.e. the 'mandate' always serves the best interests of the electorate;

(5) The interests of the politicians elected into government coincide with those of the voters.

From our perspective, the most important normative assumption is the one which requires the mandate to coincide with the public interest (4). This assumption introduces an external element in the original theoretical framework which, with a little exaggeration, almost makes it implode.

The theoretical basis for the coincidence is the utilitarian understanding of the common good to the effect that the common good is what is good for the public (for the people, or in a technical sense, the median voter). And what is good for the people can be learned form the stated preferences of the people, that is, from the choices the people make. This utilitarian interpretation of the common good is questionable in itself. From the perspective of the issue discussed here, the crucial point is that even the people can consider that at a given point in time, the position expressed earlier will not represent its best interests any more (cf. condition 3). Given that the elections are held every couple of years, the explicit content of the mandate and people's stated preferences can get into conflict already within the framework of the theory.

At this point, theorists face two imperfect options to choose from. The first option would consist in dissolving the mandate concept interpreted as electoral authorization in the conception of sensitivity to public opinion. The other option is separating the positive, descriptive elements ('Was the promise met?') from the normative and prescriptive elements ('Does [meeting] the promise serve the public interest?'), eliminating the major internal contradictions of the Manin-Przeworski-Stokes

mandate theory. In preparing the ground for the empirical study of pledge-fulfillment, we opted for the second alternative, deciding to drop the normative condition. This was supported by obvious considerations related to research methodology (cf. the problems inherent in operationalizing the concept of public interest) as well as a number of theoretical reasons, to be discussed below.

What is a mandate? Why realism?

Having settled the issue of normativity and realism, we may now turn to the second part of the title of our synthesis framework. The term mandate theory is inseparable from the concept of the mandate. In the present paper, mandate shall mean an electoral authorization that is <u>binding to some extent</u>.

The free 'mandate' (a blank authorization for the representative with the objective, for example, that one can check later on whether they worked well) is an authorization only in a purely <u>formal</u> sense for action in <u>general</u>. The mandate as binding to some extent is, on the other hand, <u>content-based and specific</u>, that is, it delineates the scope of action (e.g., the goal may not fully and in all cases justify the means). Thus, if the mandate can not be completely 'free', the next step is defining the features of the bound authorization, including its beneficiaries, its content and real-life forms of occurence.

In modern mass democracies, the authorization is not conferred by individual voters, but by a majority (relative or absolute) of voters, while the enforcement of the authorization (i.e. representation) is also realised by collective actors, in most cases, by parties.

One of the first coherent theories of this relationship based on mandates and collective actors is the doctrine of responsible party government, a doctrine that still dominates the field. This theoretical approach is of key importance for our subject, as far as it renders the complexity inherent in <u>strong</u> (in most cases: normative) versions of mandate theory manageable. In the ideal type of responsible party government, there are two parties competing against one another,

Figure 1 Possible operationalizations of the electoral mandate

Policy-oriented election manifesto: bundle of proactively and ex ante expressed pledges

Features of pronounced pledges (bottom-up/top-down; proactive/reactive, policy-related or rhetorical; manifesto or media etc.)

Content of mandate: explicit or implied (e.g. ideology of the party)

Recipient of the mandate: party or person

Source: The authors.

mobilizing the electorate to choose between two alternatives offered by the parties, and the winner eventually takes so-called collective responsibility for implementing its program package. Adopting the principle of responsible party governance automatically leads to accepting a <u>realistic</u> version of the mandate theory.

Next up on our task list is the definition of subject matter of the mandate's binding character. In the present paper, this content, in particular, is the explicit <u>public policy content</u> of authorization. This could take the form of a single election pledge, or a set of such pledges, as in the case of an election program.

As opposed to the strong ideal type, this realistic version simplifies, by means of a number of compromises, the story of binding pledge fulfillment covering the totality of policy issues involving many actors into a formula involving only a few actors and the assessment of a few party programs every couple of years. The realism of this approach is also exacerbated by the fact that it does not assume that only overwhelming election victories provide a clear mandate – it treats all party

configurations capable of forming a government as 'winners' and expects them to fulfill their pledges. Similarly, the realistic version of mandate theory, as opposed to the strong one, does not require a radical change of direction in terms of public policy compared to the preceding government (see Table 1).

The typology of representation formulated by Andeweg and Thomassen (2005), discussed in more detail below, distinguishes between representation driven from the bottom and representation driven from the top. An example of the bottom-up representation is delegation, while the top-down approach can be illustrated by the mandate, which – as it is pursued for the sake of implementing a specific policy – we identified with, and refer to as the mandate in the context of our research.

Table 1 Strong and Realistic Versions of Mandate Theory

	Strong version	Realistic version
Binding Character of the Mandate	Strong	Weak
Scope of the public policy content (range of pledges)	Complete	Reduced
Responsiveness / sensitivity to public opinion	Continuous (preferences as currently expressed by citizens)	Periodic* (explicit mandate content)
Definiteness of mandate/ degree of the election victory	Overwhelming victory	Majority victory
Public policy change of direction	Radical	Not necessarily radical, can be mild
Making of the Party Program	Bottom-up** (sensitivity to public opinion)	From top to bottom (by party elite)
Parties' responsibility for fulfilling the mandate	Clear responsibility (two-party system)	Blurred responsibilities (e.g. coalition government)
Citizens' preferences	Exogenous given	Subject to exogenous and endogenous change
Normative character of the theory	Normative	Positive

Notes: *linked to the elections **democracy within the party.

Source: The authors.

Given that the content of the mandate (e.g., in the form of election program) is defined by the political class, as opposed to the preferences of the voters formulated externally, the mandate and delegation shall not be confused from a theoretical point of view. Translating this into the researchers' dilemma formulated above: the concept of the mandate can not be dissolved in the concept of sensitivity to public opinion. In the light of these considerations, a positive and realistic version of the mandate theory—and a number of relevant research questions—are proposed for empirical research (see Table 2).

Table 2 Potential empirical research questions

Theoretical problems	Research questions	Indicators
I. Information content of campaigns	(1) The degree to which voters are informed	The depth of the factual knowledge of voters of party manifestos
	(2) The degree to which the authorization is binding	The length and comprehensiveness of election programs
		The specificity of the pledges
II. Definiteness of the authorization	(3) Strength of the authorization	The degree of activity of voters (election turnout)
	(4) Uniqueness of the authorization	The degree of the majority voters for the election program had (the degree of victory)
		Differences between the two election programs
III. The strength of pledge enactment	(5) Clearness of responsibility	The extent of the constitutional separation of powers
		The strength of party discipline
		Other formal constraints (e.g. the electoral system) and informal constraints
	(6) The extent of pledge enactment	Pledge enactment in terms of percentages ('pledge approach')
		Enactment of the major provisions of the program ('saliency approach')

Source: The authors.

So far, we have become familiar with the basic tenets of this realistic version of the positive mandate theory. Our next task, then, is to undertake a more detailed discussion on how it relates to the extant literature and what contributions it can eventually make.

The Concept of the Mandate

The concept of the mandate is closely related to both the theory of representative government and the theory of democracy. Just as public law does, political science traditionally draws a distinction between binding (or 'imperative') and free mandates of the representatives. The binding mandate has traditionally provided (democratic) legitimacy, while the free mandate has been a cornerstone of representative government. The dominant theorist of the former was Rousseau, who was not only intent on maintaining the institution of delegation in his reform proposal for the Constitution of Poland, but actually went as far to propose that deviating from the instructions given by the principals should be sanctioned by capital punishment (Rousseau 1985: xxiv).

Edmund Burke is often referred to as the founding father of the modern theory of representative government focusing on the free mandate (cf. for example Urbinati 2006: 22), who in his 1774 letter to the Bristol electors expressed the view that he would render them the best service if he was to exercise freely his powers of deliberation as opposed to slavishly following the opinion of people who elected him (Pitkin 1967: 171). The two approaches have existed in parallel for a long time in states characterised by representative government. The turning point came on 8 July 1789, when the French Constituent Assembly 'banned' the binding mandate in the heat of a stormy debate (Fitzsimmons 2002: 49). The ban on binding mandates has been 'one of the central tenets of modern representative government' (Pasquino 2001: 205).

19th century liberal parliamentarianism was the first among many to draw on this tradition based on the relative independence of the representatives, i.e. on a mandate that was to <u>free to some extent</u> (Manin 1997: 163). In practice, this was realised through rules explicitly prohibiting fully

binding mandates, either in the form of providing a legally binding status to the instructions of the electorate or in the guise of the discretionary revocability of representatives.

Fast forward to the present, and we see that voters increasingly tend to vote for parties and their candidates. Party affiliation became dominant over the candidates' personal qualities (though this trend has been less markedly manifest in the U.S. than in Europe). Instead of individual legislators, it is the parties that increasingly became the subjects of representation, which lead to the creation of the theory of party representation (Judge 1999: 71 and see below). While representation was earlier construed as a one-to-one relationship of individuals (i.e. individual voters and individual representatives), when parties took center stage, it was transformed into a relationship between aggregates of people (voters' groups on the one hand and representatives united into groups, on the other).

Party-centered representation sent the pendulum back from the free mandate towards a partial realization of the binding mandate. In 20th century politics (at least in Western Europe), parties' election programs played a significant and empirically demonstrated impact on government policy (see the results of the research program of the Manifesto Research Group, cf. McDonald and Budge 2005: 19). In this respect, despite the de jure prohibition, a de facto binding for parties appeared: the so-called 'outline-mandate' (Frognier 2000: 29). To that extent, even if the strong version of the mandate theory (based on a binding mandate, i.e. definite authorization) does not seem to prevail, its realistic version is obviously of significant empirical relevance.

Taking this into account, the concept of mandate shall mean in the present paper an authorization that is <u>binding to some extent</u>. This mandate is <u>content-specific and concrete</u>, that is, it limits to some extent the scope of action (representation) options - the collective representative does not get a blank check, does not become a 'trustee'. Content-wise constraints are primarily related to public policy, formulated in terms of an election pledge ('manifesto'), or a set of these, i.e. an electoral program. Accordingly, once we clarified the role of the mandate in our theoretical synthesis, our next task is to explore the role of parties in mandate theory.

The Theory of Party Representation

The historical process described in the previous section did not leave untouched the relations of responsibility either: the representatives in the analytic sense, or the trustees (as the subjects of representative activity), have increasingly become groups as opposed to individuals. Among the latter, the role of political parties is salient. The party theory of representation was developed in British political thought and spread on from there. According to David Judge (1999: 71), it was born simply as a rationalization of existing practice.

First of all as a rationale of the practice that parties competing in elections enter the contest upholding their electoral programs ('manifestos'). On the one hand, parties do that to somehow provide a link between the candidates in a single party and to distinguish them from the candidates of rival parties. On the other hand, they do it in order to mobilise voters in the elections by means of public policy pledges. The winning party receives an authorization, that is, a mandate to implement the election program.

This is the _electoral mandate_, a concept which according to Judge primarily served as a justification for the party discipline called for by the job of governing within Parliament. This narrative resolved a central problem of representation, i.e. that public representatives have a free mandate, while they also have a legally non-enforced natural link with their constituency and their constituents. Party discipline regularly overwrote this attachment, or the personal judgment of the representative, a tension that was released by reference to the electoral mandate (Birch 1964: 115-118; Judge 1999: 70-71). Later the electoral mandate also served to justify the policies of the (party) government in front of the electorate.

Thus in what follows, the concept of electoral mandate shall mean an authorization by the voters given to parties instead of individual representatives, which, furthermore, is not valid in general, but is about implementing a specific policy. Complemented by the principles set out in the preceding section, the full definition of the mandate is as follows: an electoral

authorization/empowerment accepted by the parties acting as representatives that as such is binding to some extent in terms of public policy.

The Doctrine of Responsible Party Government

In the political science literature addressing the role of parties, the idea of the electoral mandate was not only developed in the Westminster model, but equally in the doctrine elaborated on its basis, that is, the doctrine of responsible party government (APSA 1950; Ranney 1954; Sundquist 1988; Schattschneider 1942). The two related approaches that appeared in the early 1900s have gradually spread since, only to become the dominant paradigm of the theory of democracy from the 1940s to the 1970s. Both approaches tried to answer the question of what institutional form can be given to the principle of the sovereignty of the people and the majority principle in modern states with extended populations. People's sovereignty was not interpreted as the direct participation of the people, but as popular control over the government through the institutional structure of, primarily, the majority principle, and indirectly, the role of the parties.

The scheme of the ideal type of responsible party government can be summarised as follows based on Ranney (1954: 12) and Judge (1999: 71). At least (and preferably, not more than) two politically consistent and disciplined parties have clear and definite political programs as to what policy can satisfy the popular will. In the election campaign, each party tries to convince the majority of the electors that their program is the most congruent with the preferences or interests of the voters. The electors vote not on the basis of the individual qualities of the candidates, but rather they vote for the candidate of the party that they wish to see in government. The party winning the most seats in the legislation gets all the governmental power, and thus bears exclusive responsibility for the policies of the government. If the translation of its electoral manifesto into political practice is judged in a positive light, it will be reelected, while in the contrary case the party in opposition will come into power.

All things considered, the doctrine of responsible party government can be interpreted as a normative framework and at the same time as a gradually evolving positive framework. In its classical format, its positive forecasts have shown mixed results at best since the beginnings (e.g. Birch 1964: 119-120). Schattschneider (1942: 131-132) argues that it is the single most important fact about American parties that the ideal of responsible party government is not realised in practice. In turn, a second generation model of responsible party government was also elaborated, usually defined as that of 'conditional party government', referring to the face that a precondition for the realization of the paradigm is the consistency of the preferences of the deputies belonging to a single party.

Taking all these factors into consideration, the descriptive model of responsible party government is an acceptable practical approximation, with compromises, of the ideal type of mandate theory. One could refer to it as a realistic version of the latter. This realistic mandate theory is located between a strong mandate theory based on the binding mandate, miming direct democracy in the from of a technical substitute, on the one hand, and a still further extreme, on the other: trusteeship (see Figure 2 below).

The doctrine of responsible party government is, altogether, already a great step towards the empirically embedded mandate theory synthesis we propose. Its greatest added value is the creation of the ideal type of a 'weak mandate', which fills the theoretical gap between the pure binding mandate and the completely free mandate (see Figure 2.). And it achieves this with demonstrated practical relevance.

Figure 2 The binding character of representative relationships

Binding mandate – Partially binding mandate – Free mandate				
Delegation	Responsiveness	Mandate	Accountability	Trusteeship
		strong	weak		

Source: The authors.

The deficiencies it has have to do the conflict between the forward and backward looking nature of citizens' decisions and, as a consequence, the ambivalence concerning the role of the elections. Furthermore, the doctrine of responsible party government – though it implicitly makes its case by emphasizing the role of the parties – fails to clarify the source of the content of the mandate. In order to remedy these deficiencies, two further important theoretical frameworks shall be presented in the following two sections, completing our mandate theory synthesis.

Modern Normative Mandate Theory

The fourth, and possibly, the most important theoretical source of the positive mandate theory is its modern, normative version put forward by Manin et al. (1999b). One of the greatest merits of this approach is that it embeds static representation theory in a dynamic framework, stressing the process-like nature of the mandate as opposed to a single, static mandate. Within this dynamic framework, the starting and closing point of the process is the moment of the elections, the prominent theoretical role of which also makes the Manin-Przeworski-Stokes worthy of attention.

Besides selecting representatives, and offering the electorate to 'depose' unworthy leaders, elections provide a chance to identify the public policies to be followed. Representative government is thus realised if the government in fact pursues policies in line with the mandate thus received, that is, if the government policy is sensitive, <u>responsive to the will of the electorate in this sense</u>: the sense of the mandate defining the public policy content of the authorization act (see Figure 1).

Thus, the requirement of the voters' consistency over time, mentioned above, is fulfilled. As opposed to the view identifying representative government with responsive government (that is, government which is sensitive to the changes in public opinion or preferences), mandate theory places more of an emphasis on the role of the elections. From this point of view, it is farther away from the democratic ideal type of the wholly binding mandate, than the normative theory of

sensitivity to public opinion (<u>responsiveness</u>) which requires that citizens can constantly have their voices heard (see Figure 2).

So far it seems possible to derivate a well working empirical model from modern normative mandate theory, but there are still factors to consider. There is a similarity between the two forward looking theories discussed so far consisting in the fact that the coincidence of fulfilling the mandate with realizing the public good is a normative <u>prescription</u>, which does not logically follow from the assumptions (but rather, as we have seen, introduces an element of tension into the theoretical framework).

The question is also raised by Manin et al. (1999a: 2-3) 'From a normative standpoint, the question is why exactly would the institutions characteristic of representative democracy be conducive to' the common good? Recognizing that still no definitive answer can given even after 200 years – the authors sketch four potential reasons: (1) Those who enter politics do so with the intention of serving the public good; (2) voters can effectively select these candidates; (3) voters can effectively threaten those who would stray from the path of virtue with being thrown out of office; (4) the institutional separation of powers limits deviations from acting in people's best interests.

How strongly these conditions coincide with an empirical model of strong explanatory capacity is at least questionable. Suffice to say that a number of theoretical approaches—including rational ignorance, the extended practice of political manipulation, as well as the innumerable assumptions of public choice theory from the rent-seeking through asymmetries of information and problems related to Schumpeter's asymmetric competence ('infantilism') to political shirking—put a dent in the reasoning.

These considerations show that it is not possible to unite the public interest identified with the public opinion and the electoral mandate in a single logical framework. With respect to the fact that these theoretical-cum-practical tensions between realizing the electoral mandate and realizing the public interest, we decided in the course of the study to separate the positive, descriptive elements ('Is a pledge fulfilled or not?') from the normative, prescriptive elements ('Does [fulfilling]

the promise coincide with the public interest?'), eliminating as a consequence the greatest internal contradiction of normative mandate theory.

Delegation and the Mandate

After identifying the main lines of the realistic version of the positive mandate theory, the last issue that needs to be settled concerns the source of the content of the mandate. This issue was raised implicitly when discussing the tension between sensitivity to public opinion and the electoral mandate. Making the conflict explicit, we can say that the responsiveness and mandate theory can not be rendered compatible because they imply different assumptions on the relationship of electors and representatives. While the approach focusing on responsiveness to public opinion derivates the content of the relationship content from the voters' preferences ('What do the people demand?'), mandate theory, when placing the electoral program at center stage, investigates what politicians have to offer.

In this aspect, the ex ante/ex post distinction can be complemented with a further dimension depending on whether the direction of process defining the content of representation is driven from the bottom or from the top. Thus the static distinction introduced by Andeweg and Thomassen (2005) is a useful addition to the dynamic approach put forward by Manin et al. The authors tackle the relationship of the represented and the representatives in a closed conceptual framework through the concepts of the principals' instructions and control when developing a new classification of the kinds of representation (Table 3).

We take delegation to by the classic ideal type of representative democracy, and thus the strong version of theories of representation based on ex ante authorization. Delegation realises both representation from the bottom and ex ante electoral control, thus governing takes place according to the popular will. Delegation, however, can only be realised when a number of very strict conditions are met: voters must have exogenous and stable preferences and the political agenda must

Table 3 Modes of political representation

		Control by voters	
		Ex ante	Ex post
Defining the content	From the top	Mandate	Accountability
of representation	From the bottom	Delegation	Responsiveness

Source: Andeweg and Thomassen 2005: 512, modified by the authors.

be predictable. The ex ante side of the typology also includes a top-down theory of representation. Although Andeweg and Thomassen call it 'authorization', we refer to it as the electoral mandate or simply the <u>mandate</u>. This term is more accurate, and in line of the previous sections, more expressive, given that the authorization conferred on parties is not general, but concerns their election programs, which is congruent with the mandate theory of representation.

Conclusion

In this article, we have presented a theoretical framework of the realistic version of positive mandate theory. In elaborating this synthesis, we started out from a partially binging mandate, as contrasted with the free mandate approach to representation. Then, we defined the representation relationship as a relationship of collective actors, where the subjects of representation are the parties. On these foundations, the model of responsible party government proved to be a satisfactory ideal type for a realistic mandate theory. At the same time, we had to separate this from the normative element of authorization in line with the public interest, which clashed with the logic of the theoretical framework. The positive mandate theory we thus arrived at was explicitly weaned from delegation-based theories of authorization, which – reminiscing of the normative approach – attached independent value to the bottom-up identification of the content of representation.

The proposed framework breaks with both normative and strong renderings of mandate theory and does this on both theoretical and practical (research methodology and plausibility)

grounds (the differences are summarised in Table 1). The result of our theoretical survey is a conceptual framework we consider to be logically coherent and empirically plausible, and which can as a consequence be verified or refuted by the tools of positive political science.

One added value the present study offers to the literature – besides a number of minor additions and precisions – is primarily the assessment of, and elaborating a synthesis of, the potential theoretical sources of a <u>testable</u> mandate theory (see Table 2.). This work was indispensable for the empirical investigation of the realization of mandate theory, to which is linked the second innovation offered by the article, i.e. defining the constituent elements of the mandate strength which are suitable for operationalization.

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